criminal justice, education, and welfare. Stabilization in the legitimacy of political, economic, and family institutions, and investments in criminal justice, education, and welfare eventually produced downward pressure on crime rates. In this essay, I consider the applicability of these arguments for the declines in U.S. crime rates that have occurred during the first eight years of the 1990s.
I concentrate here on the group of offenses popularly known as "street crimes." While the term is imprecise, it has generally come to include the familiar crimes of murder, robbery, rape, aggravated assault, burglary, and larceny. Glaser calls these crimes "predatory" because they all involve offenders who "prey" on other persons or their property, while contrasting these offenses with nonpredatory crimes like prostitution and gambling." Predatory crimes are especially worthy of attention because they generally evoke the greatest popular fear and concern and draw the most universal condemnation from society. Probably as a consequence of these characteristics, we have more complete information on predatory crimes than on any other crime types.
II. STREET CRIME TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES
Street crimes are all similar in that they each consist of an offender, a victim, and at least for the crimes that are reported or discovered, the involvement of police and other legal agents. This, in turn, defines the crime data that may be collected: "official" data collected by legal agents, "self report" data collected from offenders, and "victimization" data collected from crime victims. Because self report data are likely to be most reliably collected for the least serious crimes, 4 they are of less value for the street crimes examined here, leaving us to rely almost exclusively on either official or victimization data. Moreover, national crime victimization survey data in the United States have only been collected on an annual basis since 1973. In the next section, I examine street crime trends from official data and victimization survey data for the 1990s.
A. STREET CRImE IN THE 1990s The most comprehensive official data on street crime in the United States come from the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), collected annually by the Federal Bureau of Investigation since 1930. Table 1 shows rates for the seven street crimes on which data are most reliably compiled by the UCR, as well as totals for violent crimes, and crimes to property, as well as all crimes, for 1990 and 1997.: The percentage change column indicates sizeable decreases in all seven crimes. The greatest percentage declines are for murder, robbery, burglary, and motor vehicle theft-all registered at least a 23% drop in the first eight years of the 1990s. Percentage declines for rape, aggravated assault and larceny have been somewhat less, but still sizeable. Taken together, these seven crimes logged a 15.4% drop from 1990 to 1997.
National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) data have been collected annually by the Bureau of Justice Statistics since 1973.6 The NCVS includes the same street crimes as the UCR with two exceptions: NCVS data do not report murders, and NCVS data distinguish between aggravated and simple assaults. Table 2 shows rates for seven street crimes collected by the NCVS for 1990 and 1996. Although there are substantial differences by crime type, the NCVS data, like the UCR data, show declines in all seven street crimes reported. Declines from the 'UCR data includes only murders that are intentional-as opposed to unintentional killings, such as those resulting from negligence. The UGR includes robberies in which property was seized from another person by violence or intimidation. UCR rape cases include crimes of unlawful, nonconsensual sexual intercourse. Aggravated assaults in the UGR include cases in which individuals confront others with the intention of causing them serious physical injury. They are "aggravated" if they are accompanied by a deadly weapon or with an intent to kill, rob or rape. Burglaries in the UCR include cases in which individuals break into someone's home with the intention of committing a crime, most commonly, theft. Thefts in the UGR refer simply to stealing someone else's property.
6 MIcHAEL R. RAND ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICIMIZATION, 1973-95 NCVS data are greatest for the three property crimes-all showing more than a 20% drop. Among violent crimes, rape rates show the greatest percentage decline 17.6%. Simple assaults show the least change, declining by only a little more than 1%. To assess how broad-gauged declines in national street crime rates in the 1990s have been, I next examined changes in crime rates for ten of the nation's largest cities from 1990 to 1995. Using UCR data, I calculated crime rates per 100,000 citizens for the seven crimes reported in Table 1 for Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia, Phoenix, and San Diego. Crime rates for the seven crimes in these ten cities produced a total of sixty-nine contrasts between 1990 and 1995. 7 Of these sixty-nine contrasts, sixty (87.0%) showed that crime rates had decreased. The size 7 Data on rape cases were missing for Chicago.
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of decreases were typically much greater than the size of increases. For example, from 1990 to 1995, burglary rates declined by 51.0% in Dallas, 45.7% in Houston, and 40.7% in San Diego. By contrast, for the one city that recorded increases in robbery from 1990 to 1995 (Philadelphia), rates increased by 10.2%." For all seven crimes, a majority of cities reported declining crime rates from 1990 to 1995. Thus, all ten cities reported declining murder and burglary rates, nine cities reported declining robbery and motor vehicle theft rates, eight cities reported declining rape rates, and seven cities reported declining aggravated assault and larceny rates.
8The biggest exception to these general trends was for homicide rates in Phoenix. In 1990, with a population of 983,403, Phoenix reported 128 homicide and nonnegligent manslaughter cases. In 1995, with a population of 1,085,706, Phoenix reported 214 homicide and non-negligent manslaughter cases-an increase of 51.5%.
Taken together, data from both the UCR and the NCVS strongly support the conclusion that there have been substantial, broad-based declines in street crime rates during the first half of the 1990s. The UCR national data suggest that the declines have been greatest for murder, robbery, and burglary data show the largest decreases for motor vehicle theft, burglary, and larceny. City-level data from the UCR confirm that declines can also be observed in most cases for the nation's largest cities, especially for murder, robbery, rape, burglary, and motor vehicle theft. I will now consider how the magnitude of the recent crime decreases compares to earlier crime trends in the postWorld War II United States.
B. PUTTING THE RECENT DowNTuRNs INTO CONTEXT NCVS data allow us to examine annual trends only from 1973 to 1996. I use UCR data to examine street crime trends from 1946 to 1996. Data, 1973 Data, -1996 Figure 1 shows trends for the four violent crimes tracked by the NCVS from 1973 to 1996. Trends for these four crimes provide considerable but not total support for the idea of a crime "bust" during the 1990s. The best case for a rapid decline in the 1990s can be made for rape cases and aggravated assault cases. Rape rates declined by 36.4% from 1991 to 1996 and aggravated assault rates declined by 27.3% from 1993 to 1996. These were the steepest declines in the years included in the NCVS data. Similarly, from 1994 to 1996, simple assault rates exhibited the greatest three-year decline (14.5%) since data collection began in 1973-although simple assault rates were only slightly lower in 1996 (26.6) than they had been in 1990 (26.9).
NCVS
Although robbery rates fell considerably during the 1990s, they declined even more rapidly during the 1980s.
Taken together, rates for robbery and aggravated assault were lower in 1996 than at any other point spanned by the twenty-four years of NCVS data. The lowest level of reported rapes was recorded in 1995. While the lowest NCVS level of 
simple assaults occurred in 1986 (25.3), the levels were similar to those recorded for simple assaults in 1996 (26.6). Figure 2 shows trends in the three property crimes included in the NCVS data from 1973 to 1996. Data on property crimes are consistently supportive of a 1990s crime bust. In fact, for burglaries, the declines began well before the 1990s, starting in about 1981.
Altogether, burglary rates from NCVS data dropped by 55.4% from 1981 to 1996-with about half of this decline occurring in the decade of the 1990s. Similarly, theft rates began to drop consistently in the late 1970s, declining by more than 50.0% from 1979 to 1996. The case of motor vehicle theft is more complex: motor vehicle theft rates declined slowly from 1973 to 1985, increased substantially from 1986 to 1991, and then began to decline again in 1992, reaching their lowest level in 1996. All three of the property crimes included in the NCVS were lower in 1996 than they had been at any time since the NCVS started collecting annual data in 1973.
2. UCRData, 1946 UCRData, to 1997 To put crime trends for the 1990s in a broader historical context, I next present post-World War II trends based on UCR data for the violent crimes of murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault; and for the property crimes of burglary, theft, and motor vehicle theft. Figure 3 shows trends for the four violent crimes tracked by the UCR.
As we saw in Table 1 above, all four of these violent crimes declined during the 1990s. In this section, I compare the recent declines in these crimes to earlier postwar trends.
U.S. murder rates in 1997were at their lowest level since 1967. From 1990 to 1997 murder rates declined by 27.7%-the largest decline in postwar history. The only other period in postwar U.S. history with comparable declines in murder rates happened from 1980 to 1984 (a 22.5% drop). But so far at least, murder rates in the 1990s are not decreasing as fast as they increased in the 1960s. For example, in the eight years from 1963 to 1970, murder rates increased by 41.8%. 
U.S.
robbery rates in 1997 were at their lowest level since 1973. From 1990 to 1997, robbery rates fell by 27.6%-the fastest decline in more than fifty years. The next greatest decline in robbery rates only once during the postwar period was the five years from 1981 to 1984, which witnessed a 20.6% decline. As with murder rates, robbery rates so far have not declined as rapidly in the 1990s as they increased in the 1960s and early 19 7 0s. Thus, from 1963 to 1975, robbery rates increased by an incredible 257.3%. Figure 3 shows that while recent decreases in rape and aggravated assault rates are less than those for murder and robbery rates, they are still substantial. In fact, declines in rates of rape and aggravated assault in the 1990s, like those for murder and robbery, represent the largest declines in UCR rates thus far recorded during the postwar period. Of the street crimes tracked by the UCR, rates of larceny have declined the least during the 1990s (9.6%). In percentage terms, the greatest recorded postwar decline in larceny happened from 1980 to 1984 (an 11.9% drop). Moreover, larceny rates in the 1990s are not declining as quickly as they increased throughout most of the 1960s and 1970s. 
The UCR data support two main conclusions about crime trends in the 1990s. First, the declines in crime recorded from 1990 to 1997 have been substantial. Thus far, the 1990s have witnessed the greatest recorded percentage drop of the postwar period for the violent street crimes of murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault, and the property crimes of burglary and motor vehicle theft. The only exception is for larceny, which declined slightly faster in the 1980s than in the 1990s.
Second, thus far at least, the pace of recent decreases in these seven street crimes has not been as great as the speed at which they increased during the 1960s and 1970s. Nevertheless, 1990s trends clearly represent the closest thing to a crime bust that the U.S. has witnessed since the end of World War II. Moreover, we do not yet know how great the declines in these crimes eventually will be. As this article was being prepared, the Federal Bureau of Investigation released UCR data showing that during the first six months of 1998, violent crime in the United States fell by another 7.0% and property crime by another 5.0% .9
Explaining the 1990s Crime Bust
Taken together, these postwar street crime trends provide us with at least three important clues about the 1990s decline in crime rates. First, substantial decreases have happened in a relatively short period. During the first eight years of the 1990s, UCR rates of murder, robbery, and burglary all fell by more than 25.0%. Total UCR violent crimes fell by 16.5% and total property crimes fell by 15.3%. During the same period, NCVS data show more than a 20.0% drop in rates of burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft, and more than a 10.0% drop in rates of rape and aggravated assault. Thus, we are looking for crime explanations that are capable of accounting for rapid change.
Second, while there is considerable variation across crime types, the declines are extremely broad-based. Thus, there have been measurable declines in the 1990s for all seven crimes re-9 Federal Bureau of Investigation Press Release (Dec. 13, 1998) (on file with the
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology).
ported by the UCR and for all seven crimes reported by the NCVS. These patterns suggest that we are looking for a general explanation that has implications for many different types of street crime.
And finally, the recent declines in crime are clearly time specific; that is, all of the street crimes tracked by the UCR and the NCVS have registered declines in the 1990s. In fact, for most of these crimes, the declines during the 1990s have been the largest observed during the past fifty years. Therefore, we must ask what it is about the 1990s that encouraged declining crime rates. In the remainder of this paper, I concentrate on the role played by institutional legitimacy in bringing about the recent decreases in crime rates.
III. CRIME AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE 1990s As used here, "institutions" are the patterned, mutually shared ways that people develop for living together.' 0 These patterns include the norms, values, statuses, roles, and organizations that define and regulate human conduct. Institutions encompass proper, lawful, expected modes of behavior." They are guides to how we should live and conduct our affairs; daily re-'minders of the conduct that we hold to be either acceptable or unacceptable. 2 "Legitimacy" refers to the ease or difficulty with which institutions are able to get societal members to follow mutually shared rules, laws, and norms." 5 Institutions are arguably the most important of all human creations. They allow societies to endure over time as individuals join or are replaced by new members. Thus, institutions for humans serve the same purpose as instincts do for other species: & PoL Sci. 187-203 (1940) .
12 BELLAH ET AL., supra note 10, at 12.
" This definition of legitimacy follows Max Weber, who points out that while legitimacy may be grounded in moral validity, individuals may also attribute legitimacy to institutional rules for other reasons, including fear of punishment, respect for tradition, religious beliefs, or simple expediency. MAx WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS 324-63 (1947) . they channel our behavior into forms that help us satisfy basic collective and individual needs. In fact, because humans have relatively underdeveloped instincts, they are especially dependent on institutions for survival. 5 Instead of relying on messages genetically transmitted from the past, humans are guided in large part by institutional rules that are passed from one generation to the next.1 6 This dependence on institutions has important implications for all human behavior, including crime. On the one hand, it allows behavior to change rapidly in response to environmental changes. But because institutions are little more than socially constructed agreements, they are fragile, at least compared to the "hard wired" responses produced by biological instincts.
A. How INSTITUTIONS REGULATE CRIME In general, institutions control crime in three interrelated ways: by reducing individual motivation to commit crime, by supplying effective controls to curb criminal behavior, and by providing individuals with protection against the criminal behavior of others.1 7 Because institutions are primarily responsible for teaching children moral behavior, they have a direct linkage to our motivation to commit crime. The most obvious institutional connection here is the family. Through socialization, families teach children the differences between appropriate and inappropriate conduct. These lessons are enforced by social sanctions, both positive and negative. For example, families reinforce acceptable behavior with praise, love, and support, while punishing unacceptable behavior with criticism, ostracism, and expulsion.
The impact of institutions on reducing criminal motivation is not limited to families. In industrialized nations such as the U.S., educational institutions are increasingly important in this regard. Moreover, economic and political institutions may re- 
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Institutions also regulate behavior by providing social control. As used here, "social control" refers to the mechanisms aimed at compelling individuals to adhere to institutional rules."' Social control is extremely broad and far reaching in its effects. 19 It tells us what crime is, how we are to respond to it, and what is right and wrong about it.
Social control further can be divided into informal and formal sources. 2 0 "Informal" social control refers to sanctions imposed by individuals or groups who are not acting directly on behalf of official political agencies, and includes especially the influence of family, friends, and neighborhood residents. By contrast, formal social control refers to the control of individuals that are acting on behalf of official legal and political agencies, including especially police, judges, prison guards, and prosecutors.
Granovetter uses the term "embeddedness" to describe the social relations that link individuals to institutions and thereby regulate their behavior. 21 Embeddedness provides a useful metaphor for how social control works. Most individuals are embedded in a complex web of social connections that will either make them think long and hard before engaging in crime, or simply provide enough surveillance to make criminal behavior more difficult. For most people, the first social hurdles to crime are informal: the potential embarrassment they will face when their misdeeds become known to their families-spouse, children, parents, and other relatives. Beyond the family, there is the shame associated with those with whom they work or at- tend school, members of their church or military company, civic or fraternal organizations to which they belong, and so on. Finally, in addition to all of these informal sources of social control, there is the formal legal system itself, with its threats of arrest, legal processing, and punishment. Most individuals, then, are embedded in social networks that usually serve to channel their behavior down noncriminal paths.
In addition to regulating the motivation to commit crime and surrounding individuals with social controls, institutions also reduce crime by directly protecting individuals from criminal victimization.
Families, communities, businesses, and schools play an important role in terms of guarding their individual members from the criminal behavior of others. Likewise, criminal justice institutions, especially the police, are justified in large part by their ability to protect citizens from crime.
In general, then, institutions suppress crime by enmeshing individuals in social systems that reduce their motivation to commit crime, by increasing the effectiveness of those who are informally or formally expected to regulate their criminal behavior, and by protecting individuals from the criminal behavior of others. In a smoothly functioning society, these elements are inextricably related. Thus, individuals who are well socialized in effect serve as their own social control agents. Strong social control reduces motivation and the need for protection; weak motivation makes social control and protection less important; strong guardianship may compensate in part for high levels of motivation and ineffective social control. Succinctly stated, as institutions lose their ability to regulate their members, more individuals will be more motivated to behave as they please, and their behavior will be less successfully controlled by others, and institutions will be less effective in protecting their members from others who are behaving as they please.
B. IDENTIFYING THE MOST IMPORTANT INSTITUTIONS FOR CRIME CONTROL
If we think of institutions as nothing more than shared rules that regulate human conduct in recurrent situations, We may conclude that there are thousands (or even millions) of institutions in any given society. But obviously, some institutions are more important than others in terms of controlling criminal behavior. The three institutions that probably have been linked to crime most frequently by researchers and policy makers are political, economic, and familial.
22
Political institutions are primarily responsible for mobilizing and distributing resources for collective goals. 2 They include the entire governmental apparatus: the legislature, the judiciary, the military establishment, and the administrative ageniies that implement governmental decisions. Political institutions have direct responsibility for crime control and the lawful resolution of conflicts. They are also responsible for maintaining social order, providing channels for resolving conflicts, and protecting citizens from foreign invasion.
Economic institutions are responsible for societal adaptation to the environment. 24 Economic institutions include those organized around the production and distribution of goods and services.25 The economy is responsible for satisfying the basic material requirements for human survival: food, clothing, and shelter. Economic institutions also include a stratification system that ranks individuals in a social hierarchy of rewards and responsibilities.
For centuries, families in human societies have been chiefly responsible for the socialization of children. Coleman describes family institutions as "primordial" because, unlike other institutions, they are based in part on a social organization that develops through birth and blood ties. In addition, the family has traditionally had primary responsibility for regulating the sexual 2While I concentrate here on three institutions that frequently have been linked to crime by others, I do not argue that they are the only relevant institutions in controlling crime. activity of its members, caring for and nurturing children, and seeing to the needs of the infirm and the elderly.
Because they are human creations, institutions are constantly evolving and changing, and newer institutions are being created and expanded to support or supplant older ones. Postwar America has responded to the declining legitimacy of political, economic, and familial institutions in part by strengthening support for newer institutions. In particular, to shore up political institutions, American society has funded major increases in criminal justice spending; to reduce the deleterious consequences of a rapidly changing economy, American society has spent more on welfare; and to help support declining family institutions, American society has invested heavily in education. 28 All three of these institutional responses have important implications for crime rates.
C. INSTITUTIONS AND CRIME IN THE 1990S
In the remainder of this paper, I briefly consider the links between street crime declines in the 1990s, three traditional institutions2 (political, economic, and familial), and three institutions (criminal justice, education, and welfare) that have become increasingly important during the postwar years. In my earlier book, I argued that the postwar American crime boom occurred as a result of an institutional legitimacy crisis characterized by (1) growing distrust of political institutions, (2) rising economic stress, and (3) increasing disintegration of the family.
30
American society responded to this crisis by providing greater support for criminal justice, education, and welfare institutions. 3 ' If these same arguments hold for the 1990s, then the crime bust should be accompanied by evidence of increasBEAu, supra note 16, at 278. It would of course be simplistic to argue that these institutional responses were narrow reactions to a single type of institutional decline. For example, welfare spending is justified not only in terms of reducing economic stress, but also in terms of supporting the family and increasing trust in political institutions.
I use "traditional" here in the very limited sense of indicating institutions that have customarily been thought to control or regulate crime.
30 LAFREE, supra note 1, at 70-90.
-, ing trust in political institutions, declining economic stress, and growing stability of families, as well as increasing support for criminal justice, education, and welfare institutions.
In Figure 5 , I summarize these expectations. I do not assume that all of these institutional effects are equally important, that all must be present to the same extent for crime rates to decline, or that all must be absent to the same extent for crime rates to increase. Rather, these six expectations can be seen as characteristics of a hypothetical society experiencing declining crime rates.
The extent to which major institutions in the U.S. in the 1990s approximate this hypothetical society bears consideration. I examine these six institutions in pairs, considering each of the three traditional institutions along with each of the three major corresponding institutional responses to the legitimacy crisis experienced by the traditional institution: political-criminal justice, economic-welfare, family-education. In each section, I first consider general connections between these institutions and crime, and then examine postwar trends in the legitimacy of each institution and how these trends have changed since 1990.
FIGURE 5. EXPECTED LINKS BETWEEN INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY
AND DECREASING CRIME RATES. 
Political and Criminal Justice Institutions
The declining legitimacy of political institutions increases crime in three main ways. First, individuals who perceive political institutions to be unjust or unfair will be less motivated to follow rules and laws. Second, individuals in societies with weaker political legitimacy will be less vigilant about controlling the criminal and deviant behavior of others. And finally, societies with little political legitimacy will be less effective at protecting their citizens from the criminal behavior of others. The connections between political institutions and crime in the postwar United States are most directly linked to the trust Americans have had in their political institutions. 32 Major increases in support for formal criminal justice institutions have reduced crime rates in the 1990s.
At the end of World War II, the U.S. entered a period in which its citizens reported unprecedented levels of trust in the honesty, fairness, and integrity of American political institutions. 33 There was widespread support for the war effort, high levels of respect for politicians and judges, and enough popular support to carry General Dwight D. Eisenhower, a military hero, into the presidency in 1952. 34 As a result of the low crime rates associated with this high level of trust in government, per capita spending on criminal justice institutions was lower in the years following World War II than it would be for the next half cen- tury.35 Levels of trust in political institutions began to erode substantially in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 36 The civil rights movement led the way by exposing long-standing racial injustices in American society. Further erosion accompanied the divisive war in Vietnam, a series of widely publicized political scandals, and the rights-based revolution that followed in the wake of the civil rights movement. Moreover, because political institutions are chiefly responsible for crime control, rising 32 1 use "trust" here in the usual sense of level of reliance on the equity, justice or evenhandedness of others. See TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988 AND EMPLOYMENT 26-28 (1985) . SOCIETY, 1961 SOCIETY, -1974 SOCIETY, , at 3-21 (1991 . By the 1990s, the free fall in levels of political trust had ended; in fact, there was some evidence of stability in the legitimacy of American political institutions. 3 9 While a full treatment of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper, three developments are especially important here. First, there are important signs that overall levels of trust in government, while very low compared to the early postwar period, have nevertheless been stable and perhaps even improving during the 1990s. Second, the rapid increase in crime rates in the early 1960s coincided in large part with the rise of collective political action associated especially with the civil rights movement and later, '3 LAFREE, supra note 1, at 88.
JOHN MORTON BLUM, YEARS OF DISCORD: AMERICAN POLITICS AND
9 WARREN E. MILLER, AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECrION STUDIES CUMULATIVE DATA FILE, 1952 FILE, -1996 FILE, (1996 protests against the Vietnam War. For example, the total annual number of race-related riots in America reached a postwar zenith of 287 in 1968.8 Similarly, protests against the Vietnam War became increasingly violent in the late 1960s. By contrast, in the 1990s, there was no organized collective political action that remotely resembled the scope of the civil rights movement or the anti-war protests of the early and middle postwar periods.
And finally, as the legitimacy of political institutions declined during the 1960s, the U.S. began to rely increasingly on formal criminal justice institutions to maintain law and order. Directly following World War II, Americans spent only $255 a year (in inflation adjusted dollars) on all levels of federal, state, and local law enforcement. 49 They spent a little over $100 a year at all governmental levels for corrections.
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By the early 1990s, per capita spending on police had increased seven-fold and per capita spending on corrections had increased nearly twelvefold. 51 The impact of these developments is perhaps clearest with regard to incarceration rates. From the end of World War II until the mid-1970s, imprisonment rates in the United States hovered around one hundred prisoners per 100,000 U.S. residents. 52 In fact, imprisonment rates in 1973 were about the same as they had been in 1946. 5s But these rates began to change rapidly thereafter. From 1974 to 1996, U.S. imprisonment rates more than quadrupled, reaching a century high of 427 per 100,000 residents. 5 4 These increases have been particu- By 1995, an estimated 5.4 million Americans were under correctional supervision, including 1.1 million in prisons, onehalf million in jails, 700,000 on parole, and more than 3 million 56 on probation. Freeman provides the startling conclusion that by 1995, the number of American men under the supervision of corrections had surpassed the total number of unemployed men. While much research confirms that informal social control is generally more effective than formal controls such as imprisonment in reducing crime,-" nevertheless, increases in formal sanctions of this magnitude have undoubtedly dampened U.S. crime rates in the 1990s. 5 9
Economic and Welfare Institutions and Crime
Declining economic legitimacy increases street crime rates in two main ways: raising the motivation of potential offenders to commit crime, and reducing the effectiveness of social control aimed at crime prevention and punishment. Conversely, spending on social welfare programs should reduce the motivation of potential offenders to commit crime and more generally, improve the effectiveness of social control mechanisms.
Perhaps the most obvious connection between economic legitimacy and criminal motivation is captured by the prosaic observation that compared to the more well-to-do, those with less property and wealth simply have more to gain by committing crime. The idea that economic deprivation increases criminal motivation has long been central to strain theories in U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1995 STATES, , at 5 (1997 . criminology.6 A large number of studies confirm that, compared to the wealthy, the economically disadvantaged are more likely to commit street crimes of every type."
While most criminology research on the link between economic legitimacy and crime has focussed on its impact on the offender's motivation, the declining legitimacy of economic institutions may also reduce the effectiveness of informal and formal social control. Those who believe that economic institutions are unfair or unjust might be reasonably expected to have less interest in helping to control or regulate the criminal behavior of others.
I argue that the growing strains the economy imposed on Americans directly weakened the legitimacy of economic institutions in the postwar U.S. 62 These strains were increasingly shaped by global economic trends. At the end of World War II, the U.S. entered an era of unprecedented economic prosperity. 63 The war jolted the U.S. economy out of a devastating depression and matched the undamaged industrial plants of the U.S. against the war-torn factories of Europe and Japan. America became a supermarket to the world.
But the economic picture had changed considerably by the late 1960s. Basic industrial production dominated by the United States following World War II was among the first areas to suffer-the United States' lead in textiles, iron, steel, and chemicals greatly diminished. 64 Seeking higher profits and less competition, U.S. companies increasingly "outsourced" high- AND EMPLOYMENT 26-28 (1985) . /92-5, GovERNMENT FINANCES: 1984 -1992 , at I (1996 1996. 75 Changes in the welfare laws may at first seem to contradict the argument that the 1990s' downturn in crime in the U.S. is related in part to higher levels of welfare spending. Thus, in 1996, Congress replaced the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and several other long-established programs with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) pro-
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gram. The new law sets up a system of block grants to the states, mandates that federal funding for TANF programs be capped at $16.4 billion annually through the year 2002, and stipulates that recipients can only receive TANF benefits for a maximum of five years.
However, because of the way these changes are being phased in, it is still too early to tell what impact if any they will have on street crime rates. Program caps and limits on participation may not have major effects on recipients for several years. Moreover, as noted above, recent changes in the welfare system have been implemented during a period when the economy has been relatively strong.
Family and Educational Institutions and Crime
As with political and economic institutions, family institutions can reduce crime by regulating the motivation of offenders and by providing social control. In addition, the family can play a special role in protecting its members from the criminal activity of others. Throughout human history, families have 72 UNITED STATES ECONOMIC REPORT TO THE PRESiDENT 20 (1997 Soc. 409, 409-12 (1997). been the primary institution for passing social rules and values from one generation to the next.8 With few exceptions, children have more frequent and longer contacts with family members than with others, and family contacts are generally earlier and more emotionally intense than other contacts." The family has long been the institution with major responsibility for teaching children right from wrong, instilling moral values, and emphasizing the importance of law-abiding behavior. This socialization role of the family means that it is critical for training children to respect and abide by criminal laws.
Families also control crime by directly regulating the behavior of their members. Families may limit the delinquent behavior of their children by restricting their activities, maintaining actual physical surveillance over them, and knowing their whereabouts when they are out of sight. s° But perhaps even more importantly, families often control the behavior of children simply by commanding their love and respect. A good deal of research confirms that children who care about their families will be more likely to avoid behavior that they know may result in shame, embarrassment, or inconvenience for family members. 8 ' Families are also an important crime-reducing agent in terms of the guardianship that they provide their members. Thus, families may reduce the criminal victimization of family members by protecting them from property crimes such as burglary and theft, and also by shielding them from the potential physical harm of unwanted suitors, and would-be molesters, muggers, and rapists.
Beginning especially in the 1960s, there were major declines in the legitimacy of the traditional two-parent, male-dominated family in America. Two related processes were especially important. The first was a growing challenge to the traditional form of the family. 83 As the feminist movement gained momentum in the 1960s, an increasing number of people came to regard the traditional two-parent family as a bastion of male oppression and dominance.8s Occurring almost simultaneously and related in complex ways was a growing movement toward greater sexual freedom and experimentation outside of marriage.8s In response to these developments, there was an explosion of alternatives to traditional family living arrangements.
Although it is important not to overstate the homogeneity of the American family directly following World War II,86 the aggregate changes were nevertheless substantial. In the 1950s, divorce rates were lower than they would be for the next fifty years and the proportion of American households containing individuals with no family connections hovered around 10.0%. 8 7 Af ter the 1960s, rates of divorce, children born to unmarried parents, and single-parent families rapidly increased and the total number of Americans living entirely outside of families skyrocketed.88
Revolutionary changes in the economy also contributed to the declining legitimacy of the traditional American family. Three developments are especially important here: First, the steady movement of men away from agricultural labor at home to positions in the paid labor force, which had already begun in earnest during the industrial revolution, continued to gain momentum during the postwar period. 9 Second, women joined the paid labor force in record numbers during the post- 8Id, 89 Coleman, supra note 79, at 3. war years. 9 And finally, the amount of time children and young adults spent in schools rapidly accelerated. 9 1 These changes have totally restructured the American family. To summarize, the institutionalized model of a two-parent family with a husband working for pay and a wife running the household became far less common in America during the postwar period. These changes have been complex and can be measured in a variety of ways. However, they all lead to the same general conclusion: during the postwar period, the legitimacy of the traditional family declined enormously. Moreover, the new forms of family and nonfamily living that increasingly replaced it have thus far not developed the same levels of legitimacy that the traditional family enjoyed during the early postwar period.
However, at least two developments in the 1990s may be changing the long-term relationship between declining family institutions and crime rates. First, nearly three decades have now passed since the most rapid changes in family organization began. Blended, dual career, male household manager, single parent, and even gay family forms are becoming increasingly institutionalized. As these alternatives to the traditional family become routinized, their ability to prevent crime and deviance should increase.
Second, as the legitimacy of traditional family institutions continues to decline in the U.S., Americans have relied increasingly on educational institutions to perform responsibilities that were once performed by families. These changes have been nothing short of revolutionary. From 1990 to 1995 alone, the proportion of three and four year olds enrolled in public, parochial or other private schools jumped from 44.0% to nearly 49.0%.92 During the same period, the proportion of fourteento seventeen-year-olds enrolled in school topped 96.0%, the proportion of eighteen and nineteen-year-olds in school reached 59.4%, and the total proportion of young adults twenty to twenty-four-years-old reached 31.5%. 93 Schools, like families, can discourage crime by reducing criminal motivation, by increasing the effectiveness of social control, and, in principle at least, by protecting students from the criminal behavior of others. There is a well-known tendency for offenders to be drawn from those with low levels of educational attainment. 94 There is also evidence that juveniles who accept the legitimacy of education and who have high educational aspirations and long term educational goals are less likely to engage in delinquency. 95 Schools can reduce crime by effectively monitoring and supervising the behavior of children under their custody. 96 More generally, research also shows that juveniles are less likely to commit crime when they are strongly attached to school 97 and when their performance in school is strong. 98 Educational institutions have obviously not replaced family functions in America. Indeed, we could argue that educational institutions have steadfastly resisted expanding their responsibilities from the relatively narrow role of education established in the Nineteenth Century.? Nevertheless, a growing proportion of infants, children, young adults, and even adults are spending much of their waking hours in schools. Taken together, this growing participation in educational institutions should put downward pressure on crime rates. While any firm conclusions about the exact relations between these institutions and crime trends in the 1990s must await a far more detailed empirical analysis, institutions such as those examined here do seem to provide promising leads in our ongoing efforts to understand the crime bust of the 1990s.
